By Dan Miller
Neither the November 24th P5+1 “deal” nor the White House summary of the subsequent agreement to continue the process deals effectively with Iran’s efforts to have nuclear weapons.
NOTE: I tried to address much of what follows when writing earlier about the Iran Scam and have difficulty understanding why there is very little public or even official interest in the problems the deal raises. Please let me to elaborate here a bit more on why the P5+1 “deal” is a scam, why it matters and to offer some hypotheses about the lack of interest.
The text of the English language version of the P5+1 “deal” is available here and the text of the January 16th White House summary of the recent agreement to go forward by reducing sanctions and beginning inspections of some (but not all) Iranian nuclear facilities is available here. I posted articles about the November 24th “deal” here and here and the White House summary here. The first two minutes and eleven seconds of the video embedded below provide a concise summary of what has been happening.
An article by Elliot Abrams re-published at Israel Hayom questions whether, in view of the current disagreements between Iran and the United States about what the “deal” means, there is really a deal. I am concerned that there is a “deal” but that it has little to do with Iran’s continued development of nuclear weaponry.
There has been substantial albeit unilluminating media praise — particularly outside of Israel – for the “deal.” However, with rare exceptions U.S. and European media have provided little coverage of the omissions of both the P5+1 “deal” and the January 16th White House summary to deal effectively with Iran’s aggression oriented nuclear facilities and efforts – her Parchin military facility, development of nuclear warheads and missiles with which to deliver them.
On November 25th, Israel National News posted an article titled Key Omission: Parchin not Mentioned in Iran Deal. As observed there,
It is suspected that nuclear weapons research is being conducted at the Parchin site, particularly as satellite imagery from August provided evidence of ongoing construction and testing being carried out in secret at the base. [Emphasis added.]
The satellite evidence showed major alterations at the site which the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) says were meant to hide possible tests of conventional triggers for a nuclear explosion. [Emphasis added.]
The evidence followed satellite images from August 2012 showing cleanup activities at the base, as well as images showing suspicious activities at a building suspected of housing nuclear blast experiments. [Emphasis added.]
Furthermore, the IAEA has not been allowed in to inspect Parchin since 2005 despite calls by Yukiyo Amano, head of IAEA, to allow inspections.
Power Line provides an overview here. One part of it is reprinted below:
Iran is alleged by the IAEA, the United States, and at least three European governments to have had a well-structured nuclear weapons program aimed at building a warhead small enough to fit on the Shahab 3 ballistic missile.” The agreement does not even warrant that Iran has no other dual-use or enrichment or nuclear facilities. Why? [Emphasis added.]
It is reasonable to assume that such activities continue at Parchin (and perhaps at other unmentioned sites) and that Parchin may in addition have become a venue for some of Iran’s newest and most productive centrifuges.
Uranium enrichment well beyond twenty percent will likely begin (or continue) at Parchin — despite or perhaps because of — inspections of the Iranian enrichment sites mentioned in the “deal.”
By analogy if, based on substantial credible evidence someone is reasonably suspected of having stolen a horse, that suspicion cannot be assuaged, at least rationally, without inspecting his pastures and his stables. Even if (unlike Iran) the suspect is not a notorious liar, his mere assertions that he did not steal the horse cannot be taken as the truth and alone overcome credible evidence that he did. The P5+1 negotiating team has, or should have, more than reasonable suspicions about Iran’s efforts to get “the bomb;” yet by ignoring Parchin, that is what the team seems to have agreed to do.
Iranian Missile development with North Korean help
On November 20, 2012, Iran and North Korea
announced expansion of bilateral ties . . . after reaching a scientific and technological cooperation agreement which, according to Iran’s Supreme Leader Sayyed Ali Hosseini Khamenei, has brought the two countries with “common enemies” closer.
Iranian state media said the nations will cooperate in research, human resources exchange and joint laboratories and in the fields of information technology, energy, biotechnology, engineering, agriculture and food technology.
. . . .
Khamenei met with Kim Yong-nam, North Korea’s ceremonial head of state, who was in Tehran for the Non-Aligned Movement summit held this week.
“The Islamic Republic of Iran and North Korea have common enemies, because the arrogant powers do not accept independent states,” Khamenei was quoted as saying by Iranian media.
Kim said that the expansion of ties with Iran was among the strategic policies of his country. Addressing the summit, the DPRK leader criticized the recent joint military exercise of the U.S. and South Korea in the Korean Peninsula, saying the exercise pushes the Korean Peninsula to the brink of war.
. . . .
In the past North Korea has come under fire for providing Iran with advanced missiles, based on Russian designs, that are much more powerful than anything Washington has publicly conceded that Tehran has in its arsenal. [Emphasis added.]
Iran obtained 19 of the missiles from North Korea, according to Secret American intelligence assessments cable dated Feb. 24, 2010, the New York Times reported in November 2010.
The missiles could, for the first time, give Iran the capacity to strike capitals in Western Europe or easily reach Moscow, the report said, citing data obtained by WikiLeaks. The North Korean version of the advanced missile, known as the BM-25, could carry a nuclear warhead, the report said.
In December 2010, it was reported that a team of Iranian nuclear scientists has been sent to North Korea and that the two governments have agreed on a joint nuclear test in North Korea with a substantial financial reward to Pyongyang. [Emphasis added.]
With the reduction and eventual elimination of sanctions on Iran, she will have substantially more financial ability to reward North Korea. North Korea, herself under severe sanctions, needs the money.
According to a November 27, 2013 article at The Washington Free Beacon,
Intelligence reports indicated that as recently as late October Iranian technicians from the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG), a defense organization that builds liquid-fueled missiles, were in Pyongyang collaborating on the booster development.
SHIG has been sanctioned in the past by both the U.S. government and the United Nations for illicit missile transfers.
U.S. officials said the new booster could be used on both a space launcher and a long-range missile. Iran and North Korea are believed by U.S. intelligence agencies to be using their space programs to mask long-range missile development. [Emphasis added.]
Officials said the covert missile cooperation indicates the Iranians are continuing to build long-range strategic missiles that can be used to deliver nuclear warheads at the same time they are negotiating limits on illicit uranium enrichment. [Emphasis added.]
Intelligence assessments have said that both countries could test a missile capable of reaching the United States with a nuclear warhead within the next two years.
Henry Sokolski, head of the private Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, said he agrees with U.S. special envoy on North Korea Glyn Davies that more pressure should be applied on North Korea to give up its nuclear arms.
“As Glyn Davies put it, if the North Koreans don’t demonstrate that they understand they must fulfill their obligations, then more sanctions pressure will be brought to bear on them,” he said.
“He was speaking of the North Koreans but what’s good for the goose should also be good for the gander—in this case, Iran,” Sokolski said.
John Bolton, undersecretary of state for international security during the George W. Bush administration, said the main purpose of Iranian and North Korean ballistic missile program and their longstanding cooperation “has always been to serve as the delivery vehicle for nuclear weapons.” [Emphasis added.]