Jom Kippur kriget 1973 var det senaste arab-israeliska kriget
– Sedan dess har Israel krigat mot Muslimska Brödraskapet närstående terroristorganisationer som har sitt stöd i Turkiet, Libanon, Syrien och Iran!
– Nu när Egypten förbjudit Muslimska Brödraskapet och Saudi Arabien försöker utrota MB så finns det en verklig chans till fred mellan judar och araber.
Turkarna och Perserna har stulit arabernas Palestinska agenda och gjort den till sin.
Eftersom araberna förvägrade palestinierna att integreras i arabstaterna så är det enbart araberna själva som kan lösa ”palestinaproblemet” genom att göra dem till fullvärdiga medborgare i arabstaterna och utlysa t.ex. Jordanien till Palestina, som de facto består av 70% palestinier.
- De längtar tillbaka till Egyptens fornstora dagar.
- Sedan detta skrevs finns snart inget Syrien kvar
- Iran har kapat ”palestiniernas” sak och gör dem en enorm björntjänst genom att sunnimuslimerna vänder palestinierna ryggen då de börjar uppfattas som shia muslimer.
Egypt exposed by Gaza
The Israeli war on Gaza, which has entered its fourth week, highlights three facts.
First, in terms of military force in the conflict with the Jewish state, the Arab belligerents in the conflict are no longer represented by Arab states but rather by military factions and organizations that do not operate [as part of] these states.
The October War of 1973 was the last war between Israel and the Arab states. From 1978 until today, the conflict has become [between Israel] and resistance organizations — most notably Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah in Lebanon. The latter has proved that it is using the slogan of resistance to cover its role as Iran’s military arm. This became evident as the party has forsaken its role in the resistance since 2006, turning into a militia fighting alongside the Syrian regime against the Syrian people.
The second fact is that while the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) were able to settle the battles with the official armies of the Arab states, in the face of resistance organizations the Israeli army fails to achieve the same results. The Israeli army is the strongest in the region, with an enormous destructive power and ability to commit massacres deliberately and with advanced planning. Yet it fails to impose a political reality on the ground.
The third fact that primarily concerns us and is not completely new, is that the war confirmed what has been said, that the central role of Egypt in the Arab regional system, especially with regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict, is nothing but a slogan from the past.
One can state that the central role of Egypt has undergone two phases: the phase of Mohammed Ali in the 19th century — which does not fall within our subject here — and the phase of Gamal Abdel Nasser, which lasted from 1956 (the year of the Suez War) until the Egyptian defeat of June 1967. After that, the regional scene changed and the central role of Egypt started to wane. Israel, on the other hand, shifted from the defensive to the offensive to build pressure.
The defeat was resounding, but it was not the most important or direct factor that put an end to Egypt’s central role. The defeat was the result and not the cause of this framework, as it revealed the fragile circumstances of Egypt’s role at the local and regional levels. The defeat was not only military but also political, dealing a severe blow to this role which many pinned high hopes on.
The defeat not only exposed the reality of Egypt’s role and its decision-making methods but also the reality of the entire Arab political situation. Perhaps the visit of President Anwar Sadat to Jerusalem in 1977 and the ensuing Camp David Accords in 1979 were the last attempts to confirm Egypt’s central role, but failed to serve the purpose.
Indeed, Arabs renounced that role back then and Israel did not allow Egypt to use the agreement to restore its role in the region. During the era of Menachem Begin, Israel viewed the situation from another angle. It considered the initiative of Sadat to be the result of weariness and exhaustion and thus demanded a unilateral concession — a concession on the part of Egypt alone.
Therefore, Israel did not make any concessions to Sadat regarding the Palestinian, Syrian or even the Lebanese issues. The objective of Israel was and continues to be: Use the initiative to completely cut off Egypt’s role from the conflict. As of that date, the Egyptian role continued to wane and became a sort of impasse for Egypt and the Arabs as well.
There are many indicators of the decline of Egypt’s role. Most important, Egypt had gradually lost its pioneering role in art, politics and culture which it enjoyed during the era of the kingdom, the era of Nasser and the beginning of Sadat’s reign.
Meanwhile, the Arab world had been in a deep slumber at the cultural and educational level. In 1970, the Arab world started to wake up from this sleep while Egypt — instead of moving forward on the path of leadership — began to head toward a political, cultural and educational deadlock that coincided with the deterioration of economic conditions.
Moreover, following the oil boom [since the mid-1980s], Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states emerged as a financial power and witnessed growth in economy, education and a revolution in their infrastructure. Meanwhile, the political power of Iraq and Syria also surfaced.
The second indicator in this context, and as a result of the June defeat, was the failure of Sadat’s initiative, which caused the role of Egypt to decline. Egypt became a mediator in the Arab-Israeli conflict after having been a weighty party in it, determining its nature and direction.
The third index is that the fall of Iraq and Syria did not add to Egypt’s power. On the contrary, it added to Iran’s power and interests, which is a paradox. In this context, this means that Syria, which was the northern region of what used to be known as the United Arab Republic, turned into the cradle of Iranian interests in al-Sham and Iraq.
The fourth index is Egypt’s terrible economic regression. Egypt, known as ”Um al Dunia” [Arabic for Mother of the World], is now dependent on Suez Canal revenue, tourism and foreign aid.
The current Arab political situation, with Egypt in the middle, is the fifth index. This situation is currently unfolding in light of four elements: the Israeli spear in al-Sham [Syria] and on the edge of the Nile; Iranian interests in Iraq and al-Sham; US security in the Gulf and Iraq; and the Arab jihadist groups threatening the countries of the Levant. It is clear that a country cannot fight for its central role while being a part of this political situation.
Why did Egypt’s role reach this [depressed] level? Despite the country’s long heritage, its social and political legacy and its precedence to enter the modern world, Egypt did not escape the critical situation from which the Arab world is suffering. Egypt did in fact contribute in a major way to deepening the situation during the coup of 1952.
Even though this coup turned into a revolution, it eventually transformed into an incomplete or distorted revolution. It was limited to social and economic reforms, improving the economic situation for the working class and farmers, recognizing for the first time the importance of the middle class and lifting the inherited restrictions on its growth and contribution in both public and private sectors. These reforms, which were seen as major back then, did not reach the recognition of these classes’ political rights. As a result, the political authority, the political decision-making, as well as the government’s relationship with society, remained as they were before the coup and revolution. This allowed the accumulation of the army’s power and growth in size, demographically and economically, until it became a political class that thinks it has the right to exclusively control the country. This was manifested in the January  Revolution, in addition to the army taking control over the government again.
In light of this political equation, corruption spread. The economic situation regressed to the point where the essential sources for the national revenue in Egypt became limited to the three sources mentioned above: the Suez Canal, tourism and foreign economic aid.
This means that Egyptian political decisions are now prone to foreign influence and interest as much as they are affected by internal elements.
Thus, Egypt lost all the qualities that gave her a central role in the Arab world.
In this context, one can only refer to a common Arabic saying: “No war without Egypt and no peace without Syria.” If you give it a little thought you would find that it is a hollow saying, with no actual relation to real history. It is a poetic saying based on the eloquence of a language, the exaggeration of a metaphor and the unjustified magnifying of oneself.
Since the end of the October War of 1973, six Israeli wars took place and Egypt participated in none. The battle of the Litani in 1978, the invasion of Lebanon and the occupation of its capital in 1982, Israel’s war on Lebanon in 2006, the Israeli wars on Gaza in 2008 and 2012 and the current conflict. “No peace without Syria,” is not any less wrong. The country which is rejecting peace, with or without Syria, is Israel.